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Abstract 
Outsourcing is the process of contracting a business function to an outside supplier. Two parties exist in an outsourcing contract; 
the supplier and the client. Transaction costs, consisted of ex-ante transaction costs that occur before assigning the contract such as 
costs of searching, collecting information and negotiating, and ex-post transaction costs that arise after assigning the contract as 
costs of monitoring and enforcement, occur for both parties after the outsourcing contract is assigned. However, the studies in the 
outsourcing literature are mostly . The paper explores the ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs from the 
with respect to selection of an investment strategy on specific or flexible production assets. 
that integrates real options and transaction cost economics is modified for outsourcing contracts fro
illustrative case study demonstrates the applicability of the proposed model.  
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1. Introduction 
Outsourcing is defined as the contractual delegation of a service or an activity that is normally, but not always, 
performed in-house to an outside supplier (Nicholson, Jones and Espenlaub, 2006). The advantage of outsourcing is 
based upon the "high powered incentives" of the market and the economy of scale where a specialized producer 
supplying multiple users produces the input more cheaply (Nooteboom, 1993). In an outsourcing contract there are 
two sides; the supplier and the client. After winning the outsourcing contract, supplier goes under financial and/or 
operational risks mainly come from three features: competitive bidding process, uncertainty of costs, and pressure of 
shorter contract-duration (Jiang, Yao and Feng, 2008). The supplier who undertakes the outsourcing contract may 
even (Kem, Wilcocks and van Heck, 2002) since he should bid marginal costs to beat its 
competitors while leaving a short limit to be profitable (Jiang, Yao and Feng, 2008). On the other hand, utmost the 
research on outsourcing is mode (Jiang, Reinhardt and Young, 2008). 
(Williamson, 1999). The transaction costs also occur for the suppliers as well as the buyers when the outsourcing 
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contract is assigned. Transaction costs consist of ex-ante transaction costs that happen before assigning the contract 
such as costs of searching, collecting information, bidding and negotiating, and ex-post transaction costs that arise 
after assigning the contract as costs of monitoring and enforcement. Transaction costs may differ upon the supplier-
client relationships and the strategy of investing specific or flexible production assets affect the amount of the 
transaction costs for the suppliers. 
integrating real options and transaction costs 
economics for the flexibility in producing new products is considered and extended for the suppliers who try to 
undertake outsourcing contracts. A real option valuation model based on transaction costs, is conducted for the 
analysis of future contracts considering the transaction-specific attributes; asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction 
frequency.  
 The paper is organized as the following. The next section covers the literature review of real options. In section 3 
the literature of transaction costs and their measurement methods are stated. In section 4, the proposed model is 
introduced with the explanation of the parameters. In section 5, an illustrative case study is given to demonstrate the 
applicability of the model. The last section involves the strategy formulations and recommendation for managerial 
practices.  
2. Real Options 
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the future (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999). Real 
options theory has been developed based on the financial options theory in which the value of options on uncertain 
financial assets is assessed (Foss and Roemer, 2010). A financial option is a derivative security where its value is 
derived from the worth and characteristics of another financial security or so-called underlying asset (Reuer and Tong, 
2007). There are basically two types of financial options; call option and put option. A call option on an asset gives the 
right, with no obligation, to acquire the underlying asset by paying a pre-specified price (exercise price) on or before a 
given maturity while put option similarly gives the right to sell or exchange the underlying asset and receive the 
exercise price (Trigeorgis, 1996). Moreover, a European option gives the right to exercise the option on the expiration 
date. On the contrary an American option gives the right to exercise the option on or before the expiration date.  
The real options concept was developed from the seminal idea of Myers (1977) that one can view the discretionary 
investment opportunities of as a call option on real assets like a financial call option provides decision rights on 
financial assets (Reuer and Tong, 2007). The real options theory is a dynamic approach that considers the changes in 
the future and supports the adaptations of the firm to the changes and uncertainties (Foss and Roemer, 2010). It also 
provides a theoretical framework for representing the economic value of flexible assets that are applicable to a variety 
of productive uses (Sanchez, 2003). Optimal flexibility covers an action plan that enables the firm to acquire the set of 
options which maximizes the net present value of the firm (Foss, 1998). 
2.1. Valuating Real Option  
The characteristics of financial options can be transferred to real investment issues so that different financial option 
pricing methods (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973; Myers, 1977) have been used as to assess the value of real 
investment projects under uncertainty (Foss, 1998). Black and Scholes (1973) develop a closed form solution for 
valuing a European option with one variable for continuous time. Merton (1973) extends this method by considering 
the stocks with decreasing values due to dividend outflows to represent the option value of a product opportunity. He 
defines a parameter that shows a rate of asset value erosion during the time. In addition the binomial lattice approach 
of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (CRR) (1979) is a flexible and easier numerical procedure for valuing options for 
discrete time in the case of one variable. Boyle (1988) develops an extension of the CRR procedure for option 
valuation in the case of two state variables by using simulation technique. In this paper Black-Scholes formula with 
 
2.2. Real Options in Outsourcing 
There are several studies considering real options approach for the outsourcing decision. Cao, Ford and Leggio 
(2007) use a binomial lattice option valuation method for research and development outsourcing decision. Nembhard, 
Shi and Aktan (2003) develop a financial model for assessing the option value for product outsourcing. They consider 
a three state-variable and used Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the value of option. Their option valuation method 
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is based on the general Brownian motion (GBM) standard setting in real options theory and the continuous-time 
formulation of the random walk. Benaroach, Webster and Kazaz, (2010) introduce a simplified real options models for 
outsourcing and backsourcing under demand uncertainty considering internal and external fixed and variable costs. 
Datta (2005) uses 
outsourcing decision. When the option is in the money or in other words the option has a positive value, then it is right 
to exercise the option for producing the products or services in-house. These entire studies model outsourcing with 
, Reinhardt and Young (2008) who consider real options 
approach to valuate outsourcing contract . This study uses the same perspective but 
separating the investment costs with initial investment costs and ex-ante transaction costs and also adding the ex-post 
transaction costs as a parameter to the real options model. 
3. Transaction Costs 
The concept of transaction costs was first introduced by Coase (1937) and later developed by Williamson (1975, 
1985). Transactions are defined as the transfer of a good or a service and transaction costs are defined as the costs 
associated with an economic exchange that varies independently of the competitive market price of the goods or 
services exchanged Williamson (1985). Williamson (1985) stated as "Any problem that can be formulated, directly, or 
indirectly, as a contracting problem can be investigated to advantage in transaction cost terms" (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). The transaction costs are determined by three transaction-specific attributes; asset specificity, uncertainty and 
transaction frequency (Williamson, 1991)
(Williamson, 1989, 1991). Uncertainty is 
defined as the degree of unpredictability or volatility of future states as it relates to the behavioral or environmental 
factors (Williamson, 1991; Aubert, Rivard and Patry, 2004). The number of times a client organization initiates a 
transaction, typically categorized as either occasional or frequent (Williamson, 1991). 
Transaction cost economics approach also considers two behavioral assumptions; bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Bounded rationality is the assumption that decision makers have constraints on their cognitive capacity 
to accumulate, process and retrieve information and limits on their rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Ashton, 
1998). It limits opportunities of search and causes imperfect contracts in the stage of contact (ex-ante) to the extent 
that future contingencies are uncertain, and it limits the capacity to monitor performance in the stage of control (ex-
post) (Nooteboom, 1993). Williamson (1985) defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile". Opportunism 
creates a problem to the extent that a relationship is supported by specific assets whose values are limited outside of 
the focal relationship (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). As a final point, the combination of these assumptions results in 
information asymmetry (Auber, Rivard and Patry, 2004). 
3.1. Ex-ante and Ex-post Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs involve all of the costs associated with conducting exchanges between firms and can be separated 
into ex-ante transaction costs, or search and contracting costs, and ex-post contracting costs, or monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Search and contracting costs consist of the costs of collecting information on the contract itself, the 
prospective contractual partner and possible consequences of contracting and then negotiating and writing a mutually 
acceptable agreement while ex-post to the transaction are monitoring and enforcement costs are costs referring to the 
costs associated with monitoring the agreement and then taking the actions necessary to ensure that each party. When 
discussing transaction costs many researchers conside
comprise total transaction costs, however, they need not be perfectly correlated (Groth, 2008). Williamson (1985) 
observed that A common characteristic of TCE-based empirical studies is that direct measures of transaction costs are 
rarely attempted . 
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3.2. Measuring Transaction Costs 
 The difficulties in 
measuring transaction costs are mentioned by Benham and Benham (2000) in the following: 
 Lack of a standard terminology on transaction costs,  
 Difficulty to distinguish transaction costs and production costs,  
 In case transaction costs are high, most transactions would not even take place 
 Different transaction costs may occur for different actors as individuals and groups 
Dyer and Chu (2003) take ex-ante transaction costs (negotiating) and ex-post transaction costs (haggling) as 
separate constructs in their measurement model. They ask suppliers to estimate their "persondays" quantity during the 
previous year while assigning contact between their organization and the clients. Subsequently they use the data of 
what percentage of their face-to-face communication time with clients covered negotiating a price or contract and ex-
post haggling in the form of assigning blame for problems in order to measure ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs 
respectively. They divide these measures by the supplier's sales to the buyer and gain transaction cost per dollar of 
sales since their model employ these constructs as activities related with completing the transaction and confirming 
that each party fulfill the contract clauses rather than value added activities.  
Groth (2008) separates ex-ante transaction costs for farmers in his study as fixed and variable costs. The costs of 
the farmers associated with the requirement of the documents as well as information regarding the sales are considered 
as fixed transaction costs since they result once. However, all other transaction costs arising in the process of the 
bidding procedure are variable transaction costs since they are affected by the number of bids submitted by one 
farmer. He conducts a survey where data for the time spent on acquisition of the documents, reading and 
understanding the documents, bid calculation and filling in the complete documents is collected and then multiplied by 
hourly wage to calculate ex-ante transaction costs of farmers. The calculation is also based on the mean value of the 
time expenditure and on the mean value of the hourly wage as well as on the median value of the time expenditure and 
on the median value of the hourly wage. The survey is applied in two different times and the results are compared. 
(2006) follow the suggestion of Williamson (1985) stating that the costs related with 
employees working in the transaction functions that are not directly associated with production, could be used as a 
direct estimate of transaction costs. Thus they operationalize ex-post transaction costs as  
1. The number of employees responsible for monitoring the contract and managing the relationship with the 
outsourcing supplier  
2. The annual cost of monitoring the contract and managing the relationship with the outsourcing supplier. 
They use the log-transformation for both variables in order to avoid heteroscedasticity problems and adjust kurtosis 
and skewness limits to an acceptable level. 
This study introduces a similar measurement method used by Groth (2008) for measuring ex-ante transaction costs. 
The time spent for searching, bidding and negotiating for the contract is multiplied by the hourly wage of an employee 
responsible for the contracting process. In addition for measuring ex-post transaction costs, the time spent for 
monitoring the contract and haggling is multiplied by the hourly wage of an employee responsible for the monitoring 
and enforcement process. 
4. Proposed Model 
4.1. Costs of Supplier in Outsourcing Contracts 
A supplier winning the outsourcing contract must incur an amount of initial investment costs (Jiang, Yao and Feng, 
2008). For example a machine may be taken or new employees can be hired. Subsequently ex-ante transaction costs 
arise as well as the client involving collecting information, searching, negotiating and contracting costs. In addition if 
the asset specificity of the transactions is higher for the supplier, in other words, the supplier is dependent to one 
client, the ex-post transaction for monitoring and enforcement costs would be higher to safeguard against the 
opportunistic behavior of the client such as cutting off the prices. Therefore a viable outsourcing contract for a supplier 
should provide the following inequality to be profitable. 
 
Payment to the supplier  (Initial investment + Operating costs)  (1) 
1605 Ahmet Can Kutlu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  1601 – 1610 
4.2. Supplier  
A supplier, who completes an outsourcing project for a client under a particular contract, can have several 
alternative options in the future contracts according to its investment on the production asset types. Two extreme 
views are modeled in fig. 1. If the supplier has invested on a specific production asset for the project or a product, it 
can sell this same type of product/project with minor changes to other possible future clients. This strategy is called 
specialization and the specialized suppliers usually have a larger number of clients with producing many relatively 
standardized products/projects and their switching costs are low since their transactions are not specific to one 
particular client. Transaction costs economics perspective state that, monitoring and enforcement costs would be lower 
since the transactions are not specific to one client and asset specificity is low. On the other hand, ex-ante transaction 
costs involving search and contracting costs could be higher due to the number of the clients. If the degree of 
competition is high the in the associated industry, the negotiation and contracting costs would increase because of the 
cost minimization strategy of the clients. If the supplier has invested on the flexible production assets and selects a 
differentiation strategy, he can carry out more complex projects or a group of different projects to a small number of 
clients. Total ex-ante transaction costs would be lower since working with same partners causes a decline in the costs 
of collecting information and search costs as well as negotiation and contracting costs which would decrease as time 
passes due to the relational interaction between the parties. However, ex-post transaction costs will be higher because 















Fig. 1. (a) specialized; (b) differentiated future product/projects 
Table 1. Comparison of the contracting investment strategies with respect to costs 
 Specialization strategy Differentiation strategy 
Initial Investment costs Low High 
Ex-ante transaction costs High Low 
Ex-post transaction costs Low High 
Operating costs High Low 
 
If the market demand is high on a specific project or in other words it is easy to find clients for a specific project, 
the supplier should specialize and mostly invest on specific assets since the ex-ante transaction costs would be 
relatively low due to the high market demand. Moreover, if behavioral uncertainty for opportunism of the client is 
high, the supplier should prefer to invest on specific assets with a specialization strategy with many clients to avoid 
high ex-post transaction costs. On the other hand, when market demand is low for a specific project or finding clients 
for a specific project is difficult, the supplier should differentiate and invest on flexible assets. Low behavioral 
uncertainty for opportunism of the clients also leads the supplier to invest on flexible assets as differentiation strategy 
with few clients would not create big ex-post transaction costs. 
When market demand on specific projects is low, it is expected ex-ante transaction is high but also high behavioral 
uncertainty of the exchange partner causes high ex-post transaction costs. Therefore in this regime the outsourcing 
contract is suggested not to be undertaken or to offer a relatively too high bid considering high transaction costs. In 




Product / Project X
Product / Project X




Product / Project X
Product / Project Z
Product / Project Y
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projects needs a more detailed analysis for choosing the proper strategy or investment option of specialization or 
differentiation. The model proposed in the paper has a focus on this regime. Four regimes with suggested investment 
strategies are illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Proposed investment strategies with respect to market demand and behavioral uncertainty 
  Behavioral Uncertainty 
  High Low 
Market demand on 
specific projects 
High Specialization  Specialization or Differentiation 
Low  Not producing  (high bidding level) Differentiation 
4.3. Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model 
Black and Scholes (1973) valued financial options by calculating the expectation as a function of a Brownian 
Motion and derived a differential equation that must be satisfied by the price of any derivative dependent on a non-
dividend-paying stock (Yeo and Qiu, 2003). The model (Black and Scholes, 1973) is based on the assumption that the 
stock price St follows the dynamics given by the stochastic differential equation (Nembhard et al., 2003) 
 
 dSt = St dt + St dZt (2) 
 
where, Zt is a random variable that follows the Wiener process and has the following properties: dZt = dt, and 
and dZti and dZtj s the same as the change of the Wiener process 
Zt(dZt) that follows regular distribution and the mean is 0, and the variance is dt (Lee and Lee, 2011). 
The variances of dZt  dt are dt means that uncertainty is in proportion to the length of time. All derivative 
products or services can find value in a partially differential equation under a certain boundary condition, which is the 
price of the derivative products or services. The option formula of Black Scholes is the finding of the European call 
option and put option, respectively under the boundary condition of Max[St  X, 0] or Max[X  St, 0] (Lee and Lee, 
2011). Merton (1973) expands the formula that decides option price and takes the dividend for stock into account. The 
price formula of the European call option is as follows: 
 
C0 = S0e-qTN(d1)  Xe-rTN (d2) (3) 
 
where 
     (4) 




C0 = the value of the option 
S0 = the price of the underlying stock 
X = the strike price 
r = the continuously compounded risk free interest rate 
T = the time in years until the expiration of the option 
 = the implied volatility for the underlying stock 
 = the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
d1  = the probability that a random draw from a standard normal distribution will be less than d1  
d2 = the probability that a random draw from a standard normal distribution will be less than d2 
q = the continuously compounded annual dividend yield 
1607 Ahmet Can Kutlu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  1601 – 1610 
4.4. Determination of the Model Parameters 
The paper introduces a new real options model based on the transaction costs with the value of flexibility in the 
investments on production assets considering the future contracts. The ex-ante transaction costs are irreversible sunk 
costs for the suppliers in the bidding process for the reason that these costs such as searching, collecting information or 
negotiation costs have to be occurred even if the contract is unassigned. Initial investment costs which are one time 
and fixed costs (Jiang et al., 2008) may also be assumed sunk costs as they. The sunk costs create an option in 
implementing other projects in the possible future contracts. The project types may vary from standardization to 
differentiation based on the investment of specific or flexible production assets. This flexibility has a value of time and 
uncertainty that can be modeled by using real options.  
 
Referring Eq. 1, the supplier has the right not to take the contract if it is found not profitable. Black and Scholes call 
option pricing model shown in Eq. 3 is employed for the outsourcing decision with the variables shown below where 
the revenues and operating costs are time dependent and involves uncertainty; 
 
S: Supplier Revenues(t) 
X: Operating costs(t) + Ex-post transaction costs 
 
If strike price or the sum of Operating costs and ex-post transaction costs are higher than the expected value of 
underlying assets S or Supplier Revenues, then the supplier should not take outsourcing contract for that type of 
project. The model is constructed for n future product/project alternatives to be implemented and if the outsourcing 
contract is undertaken, the option value is calculated as the following: 
 
C1..n = max[0, S0e-qTN(d1)  Xe-rTN (d2)]1..n  (6) 
 
Option value C1..n covers the n alternative product/projects and Ci qeuals to the value zero when product/projecti is 
not decided to be undertaken where i  n.     
4.5. Optimization Model  
Transaction costs based real options model that represents the value of flexibility of switching to operating different 
projects or producing different products include ex-post transaction costs. If the expected value of underlying assets is 
higher than the ex-post transaction costs, the outsourcing contract is undertaken. On the other hand initial investment 
costs and ex-ante transaction costs refer to the sunk costs which create an option for the future projects. The model 
deliberates ex-ante transaction costs are inversely correlated with ex-post transaction costs and the variables that 
determine these costs are investment choice on the specific or flexible production assets. Therefore the problem turns 
into an optimization problem for choosing the differentiation strategy of investments on flexible production assets 
creating low ex-ante but high ex-post transaction costs or investing specific production assets to produce standard 
products/projects with having high ex-ante but high ex-post transaction costs. The optimization model is shown in the 
following: 
 
Optimize f(C1..n  Initial investment costs + Ex-ante Transaction Costs1..n) (7) 
5. Numerical Example 
5.1. Background  
The proposed model is applied to a firm that designs electrical installation projects for industrial and residential 
clients. 
possible strategies are compared by using net present value (NPV) and real options (RO) analysis. The firm has 
mainly two opposite options for its future business; specializing in the design projects with costs minimization by the 
scale of economy and the learning curve or differentiating in furnishing other related services such as supplying 
1608   Ahmet Can Kutlu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  1601 – 1610 
equipment, commissioning, testing and controlling or operating. In both cases, investment costs and the transaction 
costs will occur in different ways as expressed in Table 1. 
In specialization strategy, the initial costs would be low since the workforce and the software investments would be 
focused on particular objective. However since the firm deals with a plenty of projects with differing clients, the 
operating costs will be higher because of the relatively more communication and transportation costs and serving 
special for needs in separate projects. Nevertheless, with the effect of learning, they are expected to lower by time. On 
the other hand with choosing a differentiation strategy and working in complex and integrated service projects with a 
few clients the operating costs would be relatively lower but high initial costs for supplying different services would 
occur. Moreover the ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs would be different as mentioned before. An illustrative 
numerical example is illustrated in Table 3 with different strategies and same amount of total transaction costs. 
5.2. Results and Analysis 
In the first case, the firm implements 8 different design projects for 8 different clients with $40000 total revenues, 
$8000 initial costs, $24000 total time-decreasing operating costs and $3800 total transactions costs. The second option 
includes 2 clients with the implementation of more complex projects including other services. Total revenues are 
relatively higher with $50000, initial costs are greater as $23000, the operating costs are $18000 and total transactions 
costs are determined as $3800. Total transaction costs are the same in both cases but ex-ante and ex-post transaction 
costs are different as they are determined by the client quantity and relationships. 
Net Present Value (NPV) analysis, which is a traditional and widely adopted capital budgeting technique in the 
evaluation of investments, show that first case with specialization strategy is better than second case of differentiation 
strategy since NPV of case 1, is greater than the NPV of case 2. On the other hand, when the option value of flexibility 
is taken into consideration, a different result is generated. When comparing the net values obtained by subtracting 
shared initial investment and ex-ante transaction costs from the option values (C), choosing differentiation strategy is 
better than specialization with investing on specific assets as seen from Table 3. 
6. Conclusion 
When a supplier undertakes an outsourcing contract, several alternative investment options on the production assets 
ensue. The selected type of the investment affects the costs which will be occurred for the future contracts and other 
outsourcing projects. If the supplier prefers to specialize and implement similar projects in the same field, it usually 
has low initial costs and works with a high number of clients. Therefore the operating costs will be higher but have a 
decreasing character by the learning curve effect. On the other hand, a supplier that invests on flexible assets has high 
initial costs but has options for implementing more complex projects or different kinds of projects for a small number 
of clients. Their operating costs would be relatively low. 
If the supplier works with many clients the ex-ante transaction costs of searching, collecting information and 
negotiation would be higher but the ex-post transaction costs for monitoring the contract and enforcement would be 
lower since the transactions are not specific to one client. If the supplier has a small number of clients the transaction 
costs would be vice-versa. Therefore if it is easy to find clients for a specific project and behavioural uncertainty level 
for opportunism of the clients are high, the supplier should invest on specific assets by specialization and if it is 
difficult to find clients for a specific project and behavioural uncertainty for opportunism of the clients are low the 
supplier should invest on flexible assets. If finding clients for a specific project behavioural is 
expected to be highly uncertain, the supplier should not undertake the contract. 
behavioural uncertainty for opportunism is low, the supplier should consider real options for choosing its investment 
strategy with respect to its transaction costs. The traditional capital budgeting techniques like NPV analysis is unable 
to cope with the uncertainty of the future contracts and projects. The proposed model including transaction costs based 
real option valuation method considering the future contracts enables managers to decide on an optimal investment 
strategy on production assets. For the future studies, the model can be operationalized by defining a continuous 
function showing a degree on specialization or differentiation instead of using discrete cases.  
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Costs S X C NPV 
Net option 
values 
CASE 1: SPECIALIZATION STRATEGY           
Project 1 X     Client 1 8000 200 100 5000 3800 5000 3900 1230.80 -200.00 30.80 
Project 2 X     Client 2  250 100 5000 3600 5000 3700 1406.42 -68.18 156.42 
Project 3 X     Client 3  300 100 5000 3400 5000 3500 1586.02 63.64 286.02 
Project 4 X     Client 4  350 100 5000 3200 5000 3300 1767.49 195.45 417.49 
Project 5 X     Client 5  400 100 5000 2800 5000 2900 2131.30 509.09 731.30 
Project 6 X     Client 6  450 100 5000 2600 5000 2700 2312.76 640.91 862.76 
Project 7 X     Client 7  500 100 5000 2400 5000 2500 2493.96 772.73 993.96 
Project 8 X     Client 8  550 100 5000 2200 5000 2300 2675.00 904.55 1125.00 
      TOTAL 8000 3000 800 40000 24000 40000 24800 15603.75 2818.18 4603.75 
CASE 2: DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY           
Project 1 
X     
Client 1 23000 900 1350 30000 10500 30000 11850 17814.55 1225.00 2539.55 
 X    
  X   
   X  
    X 
Project 2 
X     
Client 2  600 950 20000 7500 20000 8450 11378.70 1275.00 2153.70  X    
  X   
      TOTAL 23000 1500 2300 50000 18000 50000 20300 29193.25 2500.00 4693.25 
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